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Abstract
This paper suggests that international trade, even between identical countries, can raise
the relative demand for skilled labour. It shows that a simple generalization of Krugman￿s
(1979) model of trade in diﬀerentiated products has implications for the skill premium,
through economies of scale rather than Hecksher-Ohlin eﬀects, that are consistent with a
number of stylized facts. It provides new evidence in support of these results by showing
that increases in market size lead to higher returns to education, skill premia and income
inequality.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper suggests that international trade, even between identical countries, can raise the
relative demand for skilled labour. It shows that a simple generalization of Krugman￿s (1979)
model of trade in diﬀerentiated products has implications for the skill premium, through
economies of scale rather than Hecksher-Ohlin eﬀects, that are consistent with a number of
stylized facts.
The wage gap between high-skill and low-skill workers has widened over the recent past.
To have a sense of the magnitude of this phenomenon, during the 80s the skill premium rose
on average by 8% in a sample of 35 developed and developing countries.1 At the same time,
an unprecedented wave of trade liberalizations took place: the share of countries classi￿ed as
open according to the Sachs-Warner criteria rose from 35% in 1980 to 95% in the late 90s and
the trade share of the average country rose from 59% of GDP to 74%. The simple correlation
between the change in the skill premium and the change in the trade share equals 50% in the
above mentioned sample, suggesting that the two facts might indeed be related.
These observations have stimulated a growing body of research, aimed at investigating
the eﬀect of international trade on wage inequality. The traditional Hecksher-Ohlin model
attributes the rising skill premium in OECD countries to the growing competition with im-
ports from low-wage producers due to globalisation.2 Yet, there are several reasons why this
explanation fails to convince. First, although the last two decades have witnessed a sub-
stantial increase in the volume of North-South trade, advanced countries still trade too little
with developing countries for the eﬀect of low-price imports to be quantitatively relevant.3
Second, the rise in the skill premium has also occurred in many developing countries, which
runs counter to the conventional trade story.4 Third, most studies suggest that the rela-
1The skill premium is computed as the ratio of nonproduction to production wages in total manufacturing
from the U.N. General Industrial Statistics database. See also Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) and Berman
and Machin (2000) for cross-country evidence.
2In particular, Wood (1994, 1998) proposes an augmented Heckscher-Ohlin theory based on specialised
trading equilibria.
3Wood (1998) reports that imports of manufactures from developing countries constitute a small fraction
of OECD GDP (about 3%), although this share has almost tripled between 1980 and 1995. The point that
these volumes of trade are too small to have an important eﬀect on wage inequality has been forcefully made
by Krugman (2000). Leamer (2000) has criticised this argument, as the connection between trade volumes,
their factor content and factor prices is model-speci￿c. Deardorﬀ (2000) studies speci￿c cases where the factor
content of trade can be used to infer how a move to autarky would have aﬀected factor shares.
4Although systematic evidence on developing countries is still mixed, increases in wage diﬀerentials after
trade liberalization have been documented for Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay and
Mexico. On the contrary, trade seems associated with less inequality in East Asian countries during the 1960s
and 1970s. See Robbins (1996), Hanson and Harrison (1999), Berman and Machin (2000) and the evidence
reported in Section 4. Davis (1996) warns that these ￿ndings do not contradict the Hecksher-Ohlin model
as countries that are labour abundant in a global sense might be skill abundant relative to trading partners.
Wood (1997) proposes alternative ways to accommodate the evidence by adding more factors and nontraded
goods. See also Ripoll (2005).
2tive price of skill-intensive goods did not increase during the period of rising skill premia,5
whereas trade models usually imply a positive relationship between prices of factors and
goods. Fourth, the change in relative wages is associated with a substantial increase in the
demand for skill within all industries (skill upgrading), whereas the Hecksher-Ohlin model
suggests that a trade-induced expansion of skill-intensive industries should be accommodated
by skill downgrading.6
In this paper, we propose a new role of international trade in explaining wage inequality
consistent with the empirical evidence. We do so by revisiting the new trade theory￿s account
of the distributional eﬀects of intra-industry trade. By de￿nition, intra-industry trade is trade
in goods with similar factor intensities; therefore, according to conventional wisdom, it has no
impact on relative factor demand and cannot explain the evolution of the skill premium. We
argue that this seemingly plausible conclusion hinges either on Cobb-Douglas preferences or
perfect symmetry between sectors. We show that an elasticity of substitution in consumption
greater than one and stronger returns to scale in the skill-intensive sectors in an otherwise
standard model of monopolistic competition imply that any increase in the volume of trade,
even between identical countries, tends to be skill-biased. The intuition behind this result is
simple. Trade expands the market size of the economy, which is bene￿cial because of increasing
returns. In relative terms, however, output increases by more in the skill-intensive sectors,
since they are characterized by stronger economies of scale, and their relative price therefore
falls. With an elasticity of substitution in consumption greater than one, the demand for skill-
intensive goods increases more than proportionally, raising their share of total expenditure
and therefore also the relative wage of skilled workers.
This result has important implications. First, it suggests that the entire volume of world
trade matters for factor prices and not only the small volumes of North-South trade. In
particular, under plausible calibrations, our model suggests that a 50% fall of trade costs
between identical countries can induce a 10% increase in the skill premium, whereas full
integration can raise skill premia by up to 30%. Second, if the skill-biased scale eﬀect is
strong enough to overcome the standard relative scarcity eﬀect, international trade will spur
wage diﬀerentials even in the skill-poor developing economies, making the model consistent
with the evidence of rising skill premia in developing countries after trade liberalisation. In
this respect, an interesting case study is the recent episode of drastic trade liberalisation in
Mexico followed by an upsurge in the skill premium. We perform a simple numeric exercise
to show that full trade integration between the skill-poor Mexico and its main trade partner,
the skill-rich US, can account for a 15% rise in Mexico￿s skill premium, broadly matching
5In particular, Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) document a decline in the relative price of US skill-intensive
goods in the 1980s. See also Slaughter (2000) on this point.
6See, in particular, Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and Berman, Bound and Machin (1998).
3actual data. Third, our model can explain the decline in the relative price of skill-intensive
goods during the period of rising skill premia and growing volumes of world trade. In the
framework we propose, the so-called price puzzle (the empirical ￿nding that relative factor
and good prices moved in opposite directions) simply disappears. Fourth, we show that, so
long as our mechanism applies to intermediate goods (or activities) within industries, it can
also explain skill-upgrading.
Next, we extend our analysis by introducing physical capital. As the capital stock is an
important component of economic size, we ￿nd that its accumulation tends to increase the
skill premium. More interestingly, we show that the intersectoral mobility of capital is likely
to magnify the eﬀects of trade integration on wage diﬀerentials. Our ￿ndings are consistent
with both the evidence on capital relocation towards the skill-intensive sectors (Caselli, 1999)
and the literature on capital-skill complementarity.
We also confront the model￿s results with the data. After having discussed the available
evidence on the main assumptions, we test for the empirical relevance of skill-biased scale
eﬀects. In particular, we propose various strategies to identify scale eﬀects in three diﬀerent
datasets: a panel of economy-wide Mincerian returns to education, a panel of manufacturing
s k i l lp r e m i aa n dap a n e lo fG i n ic o e ﬃcients of income inequality. Our results are strikingly
consistent across datasets, samples and proxies for scale and wage inequality. Overall, they
indicate that increases in market size tend to raise wage inequality and that the scale elasticity
of the skill premium is roughly equal to 30 percent.
We are not alone in reconsidering the role of trade in explaining skill premia. Neary (2002)
and Thoenig and Verdier (2003) develop models where trade liberalisation between similar
countries can lead to skill-biased technical change. The idea underling their models is that of
￿defensive innovation￿: increased competition makes skill-intensive technologies more prof-
itable because they deter the entry of new ￿rms. In contrast, we show that even abstracting
from technical change and strategic considerations, the trade-induced expansion in market
size is suﬃcient to raise the skill premium. Our result is also related to Acemoglu (2003). In
his view, North-South trade induces skill-biased technical change by making skill-complement
innovations more pro￿table.7 However, trade between identical countries plays no role and
trade opening in a developing country is unlikely to have an eﬀect on the direction of technical
change, since no single developing country has the economic size to aﬀect world incentives to
innovate. Another related work is Dinopoulos et al. (2001). In their model, intra-industry
trade expands ￿rm size, which is assumed to be skill-biased, and hence riases the skill pre-
7See also Jones (2000a) and Xu (2001) on the eﬀects of the factor and sector bias of technical progress
in open economies. Another channel through which trade can aﬀect skill premia in models of endogenous
technical change is by aﬀecting the reward to innovation, an activity that is likely to be skill-intensive. This
mechanism is studied by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999).
4mium. In this respect, a key contribution of our approach is to show how an increase in scale
leads to skill-biased demand shifts without relying on non-homotheticities. Further, they con-
sider a one-sector economy only, thereby missing important general equilibrium implications
of trade models (e.g., the evolution of relative prices). Manasse and Turrini (2001) and Yeaple
(2005), show instead that, in the presence of heterogeneity among skilled workers, trade can
spur within-group wage inequality, while we focus on between-group inequality. Finally, Mat-
suyama (2006) and Maurin, Thesmar and Thoenig (2002) argue that the act of exporting
requires more skilled labor, while the market size eﬀect per se plays no role in their models.8
In models of outsourcing by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) or product cycles by Zhu
and Tre￿er (2005), the relocation of production from OECD countries to developing countries
increases the demand for skilled labour. This happens because the relocated activities are
unskilled-labour intensive relative to those performed in the developed world, but skilled-
labour intensive relative to those performed in the developing countries. However, outsourcing
and product cycle trade typically take place between dissimilar countries, whereas the kind
of trade we emphasize is pervasive and most relevant for industrial countries. Moreover, in
our view the skill bias of world trade is a pure consequence of trade liberalisation, whereas
in these models other aspects of globalisation are also crucial, such as international capital
￿ows or technological catching up. In summary, our contribution to this growing literature
is to consider a more general mechanism based on asymmetries across activities in returns to
scale that is both empirically relevant and able to reconcile several puzzling facts.9
Finally, while the literature has studied extensively the distributional implications of trade
between countries with diﬀerent factor proportions (the Stolper-Samuelson theorem being the
cornerstone of this eﬀort), these issues have been largely neglected in models of intra-industry
trade. This is because trade in goods with similar factor intensity is often believed to be
neutral on income distribution. An important contribution of this paper is to show how this
presumption is unwarranted and derive clear-cut predictions on the link between trade, market
size and factor prices.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the basic model, analyzes the
eﬀects of international trade on the skill premium and shows the role played by the intersec-
toral mobility of physical capital. Section 3 provides evidence on the key assumptions and
shows how the model can reconcile the role of trade in explaining skill premia with the main
stylized facts. Section 4 tests for the empirical relevance of skill-biased scale eﬀects using
8Bernard and Jensen (1997) show evidence that exporting ￿rms in US manufacturing sectors demand more
skilled labour.
9An alternative approach, taken by Ethier (2005), is to disregard sectoral asymmetries to focus instead on
the intra-sectoral substitution between inputs. Ethier shows that trade and technical progress can increase
wage inequality provided that skilled labour and equipment are complement and that unskilled labour and
outsourcing are substitutes.
5three diﬀerent datasets. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Simple Model
2.1 Preferences
Consider a country endowed with H units of skilled workers and L units of unskilled work-
ers, where two ￿nal goods are produced. Consumers have identical homothetic preferences,









 −1 , (1)
where Yh and Yl stand for the consumption of ￿nal goods h and l, respectively, and  >1 is
the elasticity of substitution between the two goods. The relative demand for the two goods








where Ph and Pl are the ￿nal prices of goods l and h, respectively. Note that  >1 implies
that a fall in the relative price induces a more than proportional increase in relative demand.
This is a crucial assumption for our results.
2.2 Production and Market Structure
Goods h and l are produced by perfectly competitive ￿rms by assembling ni (i = l,h) own-
industry diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. In particular, we assume that the production










where yi (v) is the amount of the intermediate good type v used in the production of good
i,a n dσi is the elasticity of substitution among any two varieties of intermediates used in
sector i. In the following, we assume that σl >σ h >  . In words, the elasticity of substitution
among intermediates is greater in sector l than in sector h. Further, the elasticity of substi-
tution in production among intermediates used in each sector is greater than the elasticity of
substitution in consumption between the ￿nal goods.
10As discussed later on, these production functions exhibit increasing returns to scale and were introduced
into trade theory by Ethier (1982).








where pi (v) i st h ep r i c eo ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o dt y p ev used in the production of good i.
The two sectors producing intermediates are monopolistically competitive al ￿Dixit-
Stiglitz with symmetric ￿r m s . T h ep r o d u c t i o no fe a c hi n t e r m e d i a t ei ns e c t o ri involves a
￿xed requirement, Fi, and a constant marginal requirement, ci, of labour. In order to keep
the algebra as simple as possible, we assume that the two sectors are extreme in terms of skill-
intensity, so that sector h uses only skilled workers H, whereas sector l uses only unskilled
workers L. In the Appendix, we generalize our results to a setting where both sectors use
both types of labour. Hence, the total cost function of a single variety produced in sector i is:
TCi =( Fi + ciyi)wi, (5)
where wh and wl are the wage rates of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively.








ciwi = wi, (6)










where ω = wh/wl is the skill premium. Intuitively, the relative price of any variety of sector h
intermediates is an increasing function of the skill premium, since h is skill-intensive relative
to l.









yi = Fiσi =1 , (8)
where the latter equality follows from setting Fi =1 /σi.11
11This assumption is meant to simplify the algebra only and is innocuous for the purpose of the paper.
As argued later on, our normalizations do not aﬀect the elasticity of the skill premium to a change of any
parameters (they only aﬀect its level).









As equation (9) shows, the elasticity of Yi with respect to ni is greater the lower is σi. Hence,
σi can be interpreted as an inverse measure of external scale economies at the industry level.12
Our assumption σl >σ h is thus equivalent to assuming stronger increasing returns to scale
in sector h than in sector l.13
2.3 General Equilibrium
Conditions for full employment of skilled and unskilled workers determine the number of
v a r i e t i e sp r o d u c e di ne a c hs e c t o r :
nl = L and nh = H. (11)
Let θ = H/L be the country share of skilled workers in the total workforce, L = H + L.
Equations (11) can then be rewritten as:
nl =( 1− θ)L and nh = θL. (12)
Substituting (9), (10), (7) and (12) into (2), and rearranging gives an equilibrium expression








 (σl−1) , (13)
which is interpreted below.
2.4 Trade and the Skill Premium
We can now analyze the eﬀects of trade integration on the skill premium. Since we focus
on equilibria with factor price equalization (FPE), we can obtain the free trade prices by
applying the above results to a hypothetical integrated economy whose endowments are the
12These external scale economies, sometimes called ￿returns to specialization￿, come from the bene￿to f
having more varieties in the production function for ￿nal goods (see eq. 3), and not directly from the presence
of ￿xed costs at the ￿rm level (as ￿rm size is constant). Returns from specialization depend on σi only, and
disappear when varieties are perfect substitutes, as in this case only the overall quantity of inputs (and not
also their variety) matters for ￿nal output.
13A production function Y = f (v) exhibits increasing returns to scale if f(λv) >λ f(v) for λ>1.A n






σi−1. This index is clearly
decreasing in σi. Note, also, that returns to scale do not depend on marginal and ￿xed costs, as ￿rm size is
constant.
8sum of those of each trading country. In particular, totally diﬀerentiating equation (13) and
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Equation (14) shows how the skill premium is aﬀe c t e db yav a r i a t i o ni nt h es i z eo ft h ee c o n o m y
(dL/L) and the relative scarcity of skilled workers (dθ/θ). We use equation (14) to ￿rst study
the eﬀect of intra-industry trade on wage inequality. As shown by Krugman (1979), in a Dixit-
Stiglitz framework trade integration among two identical countries is formally equivalent to
ad o u b l i n go fc o u n t r ys i z e ,L.G i v e n t h a t σl >σ h > >1,e q u a t i o n( 1 4 )i m p l i e st h a tt h e
coeﬃcient of dL/L is positive, and that its magnitude depends positively on the elasticity of
substitution   and the sectoral asymmetries (σl −σh) i nt h ed e g r e eo fr e t u r n st os c a l e .T h u s ,
pure intra-industry trade among identical countries, often presumed to have no distributional
eﬀects, turns out to be skill-biased.14
Equation (14) also shows the eﬀect of inter-industry trade on the skill premium. Integra-
tion between dissimilar countries still implies an increase in the overall size of the economy,
but also changes the perceived relative scarcity of factors. Since the coeﬃcient of dθ/θ is
negative, an increase (fall) in the relative supply of skilled labour has the eﬀect of reducing
(increasing) the skill premium.15 This eﬀect works through the well-known mechanics of the
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem, and can dampen or magnify the upward pressure on the
skill premium due to the market size eﬀect. Moreover, it can lead to a decline in the absolute
wage of the factor perceived as more abundant after trade integration, whereas the ￿rst eﬀect
(dL/L) tends to increase the real wage of all factors.
What drives the skill bias of trade? Growth in the size of the market increases relative
productivity in the skill-intensive sector, since it enjoys stronger returns to scale. At the same
time, an elasticity of substitution in consumption greater than one ensures that the relative
price of skill-intensive goods does not fall too much, so that the market size expansion increases
the share of skill-intensive goods in total income and hence the skill premium.

























  ( −1)(σl−σh)
 (σh−1)(σl−1)
From this expression it can be seen that the elasticity to scale only depends on { , σl,σ h} and that, under
our assumptions, larger countries tend to have, ceteris paribus, higher skill premia.
15Note that the coeﬃcient of dθ/θ is negatively aﬀected by the elasticity of substitution  ,a sah i g hs u b s t i -
tutability implies a weak price eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h er e l a t i v es u p p l y .
92.5 Introducing Physical Capital
We now show how the introduction of physical capital, assumed to be mobile across sectors,
magni￿es the skill-biased scale eﬀect of trade. With physical capital (K), the total cost
function of a single variety produced in sector i becomes:
TCi =( Fi + ciyi)rγw
1−γ
i , (15)
where r is the rental rate and γ is the share of capital in sector i￿s total cost. For simplicity,
equation (15) considers the case where capital intensity is the same in both sectors (γ = γh =




















Using Shephard￿s lemma, the demand for each factor can be found from the total cost function
(15). Noting that ∂
∂wirγw
1−γ







i ,w eh a v et h a tt h e
conditions for full employment of physical capital, skilled and unskilled workers are given by:
K = γrγ−1w
1−γ
h nh(Fh + chyh)+γrγ−1w
1−γ
l nl(Fl + clyl) (18)
H =( 1 − γ)rγw
−γ
h nh(Fh + chyh)
L =( 1 − γ)rγw
−γ
l nl(Fl + clyl).
After setting wl =1 , we can use (18) to express nh and nl as functions of the skill premium


















Substituting (19) into (17) and solving for ω gives the equilibrium skill premium. Diﬀerenti-
ating with respect to ω, K and L = H + L, and using the implicit function theorem, we ￿nd
16The assumption of equal capital shares in the two sectors simpli￿es signi￿cantly the algebra and seems
natural, given that there is no strong evidence of any robust correlation between capital intensity and skill-
intensity. In fact, equal capital intensity is also the benchmark case studied by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) in
their related work on outsourcing and wage inequality. In any event, we have also analyzed the more general
case when the two sectors diﬀer in capital intensity. We report in a following note how relaxing this assumption
aﬀects the main results.






















where again θ = H/L is the share of skilled workers in the total labour force.17 Note that the
coeﬃcient multiplying the scale variables in the square bracket of the numerator is equal to
the scale elasticity in (14). But now the denominator in (20) is less than one and decreasing
in γ.18 Therefore, the eﬀect on the skill premium of trade integration among two identical
countries, i.e., a doubling of both K and L, is now greater the larger is the share γ of capital
in total cost.19 Further, equation (20) shows that capital accumulation and capital in￿ows
tend to increase the skill premium, as they contribute to expand the scale of the economy.
This result is consistent with the literature documenting capital-skill complementarities (see
Krusell et al. 2000, among others). To see why capital magni￿es the eﬀects of trade integration





Equation (21) shows that the trade-induced rise in the skill premium is associated with a
relative increase in capital intensity of ￿rms operating in sector h. The reason is that, by
expanding market size, trade integration increases the relative productivity of the resources
used in the sector enjoying stronger returns to scale. Hence, trade implies an increase in
the relative marginal productivity of capital in sector h. Since in equilibrium the rental rate
must be equalized across sectors, the only way of restoring the equality after trade integration
is by shifting capital out of the less skill-intensive sector and into the skill-intensive sector.
As a consequence, the endowment of capital per worker rises for the skilled and falls for the
unskilled, which further increases wage inequality. Capital reallocations toward skill-intensive
sectors introduce the possibility that the real wage of unskilled workers may actually fall with
trade integration between identical countries. This is an interesting possibility, since empirical
17The elasticity to a change in the relative skill-endowment θ is here omitted, though straightforward to
calculate, because we are interested in showing how capital reallocation aﬀects the scale eﬀect.
18Note that, assuming decreasing marginal returns to capital in both sectors, we have γ
σi
σi−1 < 1 for i = h,l.
This ensures that the denominator of (20) is positive.
19In the general case where the capital-intensity is allowed to diﬀer across sectors, we ￿nd that an equi-
proportional increase in the overall scale of the economy (H, L and K) is more skill-biased when the skill-
intensive sector is also capital intensive. Further, an increase in capital only is more bene￿cial for the factor
used in the capital-intensive sector, while an equi-proportional increase in H and L, by raising the price of
capital, hurts more the factor used in the capital-intensive sector.
20To obtain (21), note that Kir = γPiYi then use (9), (10) and (16).
11studies suggest that the real wage of less skilled workers may have declined in the US.21 Note,
however, that also the standard Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect (due to trade integration with less
developed countries) may have contributed to this fact.
A similar mechanism is at work in Caselli (1999), where a skill-biased technological revo-
lution induces a reallocation of capital toward the skill-intensive sectors. He also documents
capital ￿ows to skill-intensive industries in the US during the period of rising skill premium.
Our contribution is to show that such a reallocation of capital can also be due to trade
integration.
3 Trade and Wages: Reconsidering the Facts
In this section, we show how the model can reconcile an important role of trade in explaining
the rising skill premia with the main stylized facts. We start by considering the evidence on
the main assumptions of the model. This will provide us with indicative estimates of the key
parameters needed to quantify the skill bias of trade. After having shown that the scale eﬀect
can be large in magnitude, we will argue that it can also explain the decline in the relative
price of skill-intensive goods and skill-upgrading within industries.
3.1 Evidence on the Key Assumptions
Our results rest on returns to scale being stronger in the skill-intensive sectors and the elas-
ticity of substitution between goods of diﬀerent skill-intensity being greater than one. How
realistic are these assumptions? Morrison and Siegel (1999) estimate returns to scale in US
manufacturing industries at the two-digit industry level for the period 1979-1989. Figure 1
plots their estimates against a measure of sectoral skill-intensity. For each industry, the ver-
tical axis reports the output elasticity of the long-run total cost function (an inverse measure
of overall scale economies) and the horizontal axis the share of production workers in total
employment in 1990 (an inverse measure of skill-intensity). The diagram clearly shows a
positive correlation between skill-intensity and scale economies. We also report a weighted
regression line, whose slope coeﬃcient and standard error are 0.59 and 0.21, respectively.22
21Such a fall seems con￿ned to the period 1980-1995 and to have aﬀected mostly male workers at the
bottom of the wage distribution. Quantifying it poses potentially serious problems arising from the diﬃculty
in measuring the increase in product quality and the value of new goods. Furthermore, during the past decades
there has been a large increase in non-wage compensations that are often not accounted for in computing real
earnings. See Katz and Author (1999), and references therein, for evidence and discussion.
22The measure of scale economies illustrated in Figure 1 includes both internal and external economies of
scale and is therefore a good proxy for total scale economies. Morrison and Siegel (1999) also compute a
measure of scale economies that isolates external eﬀects (the most relevant in our model) and whose linear
correlation with the former equals .95. Not surprisingly, when we run the same regression as in Figure 1 using
this alternative measure of scale economies, we ￿nd very similar results (the regression coeﬃcient equals .52
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Figure 1: Skill-intensity and increasing returns
Similar results are reported by Antweiler and Tre￿er (2002); using international trade data
for 71 countries and a very diﬀerent methodology, they ￿nd that skill-intensive sectors, such as
Petroleum Re￿neries and Coal Products, Pharmaceuticals, Electric and Electronic machinery
and Non-Electrical Machinery, have an average scale elasticity around 1.2, whereas low skill-
intensive sectors, such as Apparel, Leather, Footwear and Food, are characterized by constant
returns.23 More generally, given that skill-intensive activities often have the nature of ￿xed
costs (R&D and Marketing are two examples), it is reasonable to expect that they may
generate scale economies.24 We provide a possible micro-foundation for these asymmetries in
returns to scale in 18 US two-digit SIC industries using diﬀerent data and methodology. Remarkably, when
we run the regression plotted in Figure 1 using their estimates, we ￿nd much the same result: the coeﬃcient
on the share of non-production workers equals .53, with a standard error of .30.
23Simple calculations on their results show that manufacturing sectors with strong evidence of increasing
returns have an average index of skill-intensity (the normalized ratio of workers who completed high school
to those who did not) equal to 0.4 (0.32 when including natural resources), while those with constant returns
have an average value of 0.12. The remaining sectors, with non-robust estimates of returns to scale, lie in the
intermediate range, with an average skill-intensity of 0.23.
24Some in￿uential papers, e.g., Burnside (1996) and Basu and Fernald (1997), ￿nd little evidence of increasing
returns in the average manufacturing industry. This is not so surprising, given that estimating returns to scale
poses serious methodological diﬃculties. Yet, independent of the methodology used, the empirical literature
always ￿nds strong sectoral asymmetries in returns to scale. For instance, Burnside (1996) shows that the
cross-industry equality restrictions on the parameters capturing returns to scale are always and overwhelmingly
rejected. Unfortunately, his estimates of industry-level returns to scale suﬀer from loss of precision once the
cross-industry equality restrictions are removed. Yet, after discarding implausible estimates, the remaining
ones show a positive and signi￿cant association with skill-intensity.
13increasing returns in another paper (Epifani and Gancia, 2006).
Moving to our second crucial assumption, both direct and indirect evidence suggests that
the elasticity of substitution between goods with diﬀerent skill-intensity ( ) is greater than
one. A unit elasticity would imply that expenditure shares are unresponsive to relative price
changes, but this is contradicted by US data. To show this, we have ￿rst computed the relative
expenditure (Eh/El) on two aggregates of high and low skill-intensive goods.25 In the years
from 1980 to 2000, we ￿nd that the relative expenditure on skill-intensive goods increased by
more than 25%, from 1.04 to 1.3. Then, following a standard practice, we have computed the
price index for each aggregate as the average of the price de￿ators of industries belonging to
each group weighted by the employment shares at the beginning of the period.26 Using 1990
as the base year, we ￿nd that the relative price of unskill-intensive goods (Pl/Ph) increased
by more than 25%, from 0.93 in 1980 to 1.20 in 2000, a result broadly consistent with most
of the studies on product prices surveyed in Slaughter (2000).
In Figure 2, we plot the relationship between expenditure shares and the relative price.
The log of the relative expenditure on skill-intensive goods is on the vertical axis, log(Eh/El),
and the log of the relative price of unskill-intensive goods is on the horizontal axis, log(Pl/Ph).
Also reported in the ￿gure is a regression line, whose slope coeﬃcient and standard error are
0.44 and 0.08, respectively, with an R-squared of 0.62. Given that the slope coeﬃcient is equal
to   − 1, the estimated coeﬃcient implies an elasticity of substitution close to 1.5, consistent
with our assumption. When controlling for the log of per capita GDP, the coeﬃcient of the
relative price is slightly reduced (0.36), but is still signi￿cant at the 7%-level (with a standard
error of 0.19). In contrast, the coeﬃcient of per capita GDP is positive (0.02), as expected,
but small and imprecisely estimated (its standard error equals 0.05).
Compelling indirect evidence also indicates that   is signi￿cantly greater than one. In
particular, in our model   coincides with the aggregate elasticity of substitution in production
between skilled and unskilled workers.27 We can then refer to studies that provide estimates
of this alternative parameter. Freeman (1986) concludes his review of the empirical evidence
suggesting a value for the elasticity of substitution between more and less educated labour in
the range between 1 and 2. Hamermesh and Grant (1979) review 20 estimates of the elasticity
of substitution between production and non-production workers and ￿nd a mean estimate of
25Data is from the OECD STAN Database, whose principal source for the US is the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. The aggregate of skill-intensive goods includes: Chemicals and chemical products, Coke, re￿ned
petroleum products and nuclear fuel, Machinery and equipment, Transport equipment, and Printing and pub-
lishing. The aggregate of unskill-intensive goods includes all the other manufacturing industries. Expenditure
on each aggregate is calculated as production plus net imports.
26Our results are unchanged when using end of the period employment shares as weights.
27This is a special feature of the speci￿c factor model we use. In a more general formulation studied in the
Appendix, we show that an aggregate elasticity of substitution in production greater than one also implies an
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Figure 2: Relative expenditure as a function of the relative price
2 . 3 . U s i n gad i ﬀerent macroeconomic approach, Krusell et al. (2000) report an estimate of
1.67 for the US economy, while Katz and Murphy (1992) ￿nd a value of 1.41.
3.2 Quantitative Relevance
The ￿rst critique to traditional trade-based explanations concerns their quantitative relevance:
North-South trade ￿ows simply do not seem to be large enough to signi￿cantly aﬀect the skill
premium.28 Compared to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin approach, our model is less exposed
to this criticism as it shows that the entire volume of world trade matters for relative wages
and not only its net factor content. It remains to argue that the trade-induced skill-biased
scale eﬀect can be of signi￿cant magnitude. To do so, we compute the scale elasticity of
the skill premium given by equation (20). A conventional value for the capital share, γ,i s
1/3. As argued above, estimates of the elasticity of substitution   are mostly in the range
(1 - 2), and therefore we take   =1 .5 as a reasonable benchmark. Moving to industry-
level returns to scale, recall that in our model they equal σi/(σi − 1).G i v e n t h a t m o s t
28Leamer (2000) warns that low volumes of trade are compatible with external product markets that dictate
lower wages for unskilled workers, because the relationship between the factor content of trade and factor prices
is model speci￿c. In fact, our model is an example of a situation in which trade can aﬀect factor prices even
when the net factor content of trade is zero (e.g., in case of trade integration between identical countries).
15studies ￿nd no signi￿cant departure from constant returns to scale in the unskill-intensive
sectors, we set σl/(σl − 1) = 1 and let σh/(σh − 1),o nw h i c ht h e r ei sm o r ed i s a g r e e m e n t ,
vary. Figure 3 shows the scale elasticity of the skill premium (on the vertical axis) as a
function of σh/(σh − 1) (on the horizontal axis) for some critical values of  .I tc a nb eu s e d
to perform some interesting experiments.29 For instance, with average returns to scale equal
to 1.2( σh =6 )in the skill-intensive sectors (consistent with Antweiler and Tre￿er, 2002), the
graph shows that the scale elasticity of the skill premium ranges from zero (for   =1 )t o
13% (for   =2 ) , with a value around 8% for   =1 .5. Hence, for plausible parameterizations,
the model suggests that trade integration between two identical countries would increase the
skill premium by roughly 10%. With less conservative estimates, the scale elasticity of the
skill premium would grow very large. For instance, with average returns to scale equal to 1.4
(σh =3 .5) in the skill-intensive sectors (consistent with Morrison and Siegel, 1999), the scale
elasticity of the skill premium would rise over 20% even with an elasticity of substitution less
than two.30 In contrast, with returns to scale equal to 1.1 (σh =1 1 )the scale elasticity of the
skill premium would be below 6%, unless we believe in more extreme estimates for  .31
It is also worth stressing that these quanti￿cations do not require unreasonable volumes
of trade. This can be seen by computing the import to GDP ratio in the benchmark case of
two identical countries with σl →∞ . Given that unskill-intensive products are homogeneous,
they will not be traded in the presence of any arbitrarily small transportation cost. On the
contrary, one half of production of the skill-intensive sector is shipped abroad. The import
share is thus (1/2)ωθ/(ωθ +1− θ). Using plausible values, like ω =1 .5 and θ =1 /3,t h i s
expression yields an import share around 0.2, a little high for the US economy, but lower than
the import share of most other countries.
More generally, it is possible to show how the skill bias of trade varies with the volume
of trade by introducing iceberg trade costs. Assume that t ≥ 1 u n i t so fa ni m p o r t e dv a r i e t y
must be shipped for one unit to arrive at destination. For simplicity, we restrict our analysis
to the model without capital and we study a symmetric case in which a country trades with
M identical countries. The latter assumption isolates the scale component of trade, which is
our focus, and implies that prices and wages are identical in all countries. Since iceberg trade
costs do not aﬀect monopoly pricing, equations (6) and (11) still apply. Using these and the
fact that the price of an imported variety is t times the domestic price, the price index of the
29Note from equation (20) that dω/ω also depends on θ and ω. Numerical simulations show their eﬀect to
be negligible. To draw Figure 3, we have used values of 0.35 and 1.4, respectively.
30Note, however, that Morrison and Siegel (1999) estimate positive, but much smaller, increasing returns
even in less skill-intensive sectors. Taking this into account would lower the scale elasticity of the skill premium
computed in Figure 3.
31In the Appendix, we discuss a more general model where both sectors employ both types of workers and
s h o wt h a t ,e v e ni nt h a tc a s e ,t h es c a l ee ﬀect can be quantitatively large. An alternative model with labour
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Figure 3: Scale elasticity of the skill premium
s k i l li n t e n s i v eg o o d( 4 )i nag i v e nc o u n t r yc a nb ee x p r e s s e da s :
Ph = whH1/(1−σh) ¡
1+Mt1−σh¢1/(1−σh) , (22)
where H is the skill-endowment of the typical country. A similar formula holds for Pl.F r o m
demand, we can ￿nd the wage bill share of skilled workers as a function of prices only, ωH/L =
(Ph/Pl)








This equation relates the skill premium to factor supplies and trade openness. The only
diﬀerence introduced by trade frictions is that foreign endowments are discounted by the
factor t1−σi: the higher the trade costs and the elasticity of substitution between varieties,
the lower the trade volume and thus the contribution of foreign endowments to the relevant
market size. Given our assumption  >1 >σ h >σ l, the skill premium increases if domestic
and foreign country size grow, if new countries join the world trading system and, of course,
if trade costs fall. Setting σl →∞as the usual benchmark, we can derive the elasticity of the

























17where the term Mt1−σh/
¡
1+Mt1−σh¢
is the share of imports in the skill-intensive sector.
We can use this formula to do a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation of the impact of
scale eﬀects in the US economy over the years 1950-2000. For M =5and σh =6 ,ad r o p
in trade costs from 2 to 1.5 (roughly matching the change in the import share from 0.04 to
0.14, if the skill-intensive sector accounts for one third of output) together with a doubling
of domestic and world labour force increases the skill premium by 8-10% if   =1 .5 and by
12-15% if   =2 , where the range of values depends on whether we use the import share
at the beginning or at the end of the period. These numbers suggest that trade and scale
eﬀects alone can explain a substantial fraction of the 20-30% increase (according to various
measures) in the US skill-premium. In smaller and more open countries, these eﬀects will be
stronger. As a further illustration, we use (23) to compute the percentage increase in the skill
premium after a reduction of trade barriers from t =2to t =1 .5 (partial integration) or to
t =1(full integration) for a country that is trading with M =1 0identical economies. The
results, for diﬀerent parameter values, are reported in Table 1, showing that full integration
can raise the skill premium by up to 32% and partial integration by 11%. Of course, these
numbers are much reduced when scale economies are very weak (bottom line).
Table 1: Trade Integration and dω/ω
dt/t = −100% dt/t = −50%
  =2   =1 .5   =2   =1 .5
σh =3 .53 1 .8% 20% 10.8% 7.1%
σh =6 2 3 .7% 15.2% 5.8% 3.9%
σh =1 1 1 2 .7% 8.3% 0.7% 0.5%
Note: t0 =2 ,σ l = ∞,M=1 0
A second observation, seemingly at odds with trade models, is that commercial liberali-
sations seem to be followed by increases in the skill premium in some developing countries.
Our model can rationalize this fact if the skill-biased scale eﬀect is strong enough to overcome
the factor proportions eﬀect in skill-scarce countries. To see whether this is more than just a
theoretical possibility, we use our model to study the recent episode of trade liberalisation in
Mexico. This case is of particular interest because, prior to 1985, Mexico could be considered
a closed economy due to heavy policies of trade protection. In 1985, Mexico announced its
decision to join the GATT and undertook major reforms leading to a reduction of tariﬀsb y
45% and of import licenses by more than 75% within three years. During the same period,
the skill premium, starting from a value of 1.84, rose by more than 17%.
The Mexico experience is also interesting because its major trade partner is the skill-
abundant US. We can then perform the following thought experiment. Assuming that Mexico
was in autarky in 1985, we ask what our model says about the eﬀect of a complete and
18instantaneous trade integration with the US. To answer this question, we ￿rst need measures
of the economic size of the two countries and their relative skill endowment, so that we can
compute the overall market enlargement and the change in factor scarcity after integration.
We limit to the manufacturing sector, as it produces most of the traded goods. ILO statistics
report that employment in manufacturing was about 5.5 million in Mexico and 21 million
in the US. Capital per worker was instead 113% higher in the latter country. As for the
skill endowment, Hanson and Harrison (1999) report that the share of white-collar workers in
manufacturing employment was 0.26 in Mexico. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) report
that the same ￿gure was 0.35 in the US. Making use of the employment data, we can compute
a share of white-collar workers equal to 0.33 for the sum of the two economies. Then, a
move from autarky to the integrated equilibrium implies the following changes in Mexico:
dL/L =3 .8, dK/K =8 .1 and dθ/θ =0 .27. Using these numbers together with conservative
parameter values (γ =1 /3,   =1 .5, σh =6 , σl = ∞), our model predicts the following change
in the Mexican skill premium:
dω
ω
=+ 0 .40 − 0.25 = +0.15
where the ￿rst number represents the positive scale eﬀect and the second number the negative
factor proportions eﬀect. Overall, trade opening in the skill-scarce Mexico may lead to a
considerable 15% increase in the skill premium. These simple calculations suggest that the
market size eﬀect can play a signi￿cant role in developing countries that experience drastic
trade liberalisations.
3.3 Reconciling Wages and Prices
The third puzzling fact that a satisfactory model should explain is the evolution of relative
prices. Though the empirical ￿ndings are sometimes mixed, they tend to suggest a decline in
the relative price of skill-intensive goods during the period of rising skill premia. Our model
can help understand this evidence, as it breaks the simple positive relation between the price
of goods and factors implied by the standard trade theory. On the one hand, a trade-induced

















Our assumption σl >σ h implies that a larger market is associated with a lower relative
price of the skill-intensive ￿nal good: as the skill-intensive sector is characterized by stronger
returns to scale, its output grows more after an increase in market size and this depresses its
19relative price.
On the other hand, trade increases the relative price of each variety of intermediates in the





These contrasting implications concerning the eﬀects of international trade on price indexes
and prices of individual goods may shed light on the mixed results emerging from empirical
studies using diﬀerent methodologies and diﬀerent levels of sectoral aggregation. In particular,
it is suggestive that Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) show a decline in the relative price of skill-
intensive goods using a high level of aggregation, whereas Krueger (1997) ￿nds the opposite
result using highly disaggregated data.
3.4 Market Size and Skill-Upgrading
A ￿nal argument often used to discredit the role of trade is that the demand for skill increased
within all industries. We close this section by showing how our theory can also account for this
stylized fact. All we need is to interpret the model of Section 2 as describing a single industry
(or even a single plant) and to add an upward sloping supply curve of skilled labour. More
precisely, assume that in the economy there are two industries producing ￿nal consumption
goods, X and Y , using industry-speci￿c intermediates of diﬀerent skill intensity according to



















The production functions for Xl and Xh are identical to those for Yl and Yh, still given by
(3). Thus, returns to scale are higher for intermediates Xh and Yh (employing skilled workers
only) than for intermediates Xl and Yl (employing unskilled workers only). The only diﬀerence
between the two industries X and Y lies in the parameters αy and αx, capturing the relative
importance of skill-intensive intermediates. Note that this formulation preserves entirely our
basic insight: that skill intensive activities (even within industries or plants) are characterized
by stronger returns to scale. Under these assumptions, the wage bill share of skilled workers












32Note that   is now to be interpreted as the elasticity of substitution in production between inputs with
diﬀerent skill-intensity.
20where Hx and Lx represent employment in industry X of skilled and unskilled workers, re-
spectively. An analogous expression holds for industry Y . Imposing wage equalization across
industries, full employment, and using the reduced forms for Xh and Xl,w ec a nd e r i v ea n















Note that any increase in H and L must be matched by a proportional increase in Hx and
Lx. The same happens in industry Y . Then, if the supply of skill is upward sloping, any
increase in the skill premium (due to, say, a market size expansion) will raise H relative to
L and, as a consequence of (25), every industry will employ a higher share of skilled workers.
The intuition for this result (see eq. 24) is again that, as long as the activities performed by
skilled workers enjoy stronger returns to scale than those performed by the unskilled, and the
elasticity of substitution among them is suﬃciently high, any increase in market size raises
the relative demand for skill, even within industries or plants.33
4 Empirical Evidence
T h em a i np r e d i c t i o no fo u rt h e o r yi sap o s i t i v ee ﬀect of market size expansion on the skill
premium. In this section, we confront this prediction with the data. As recognized by a
recent literature,34 a country￿s overall market size can be identi￿ed empirically by two major
components: the size of the internal market (proxied by measures of country size) and the
degree of integration with foreign markets (proxied by the openness ratio). Thus, a natural
way to test our model is to estimate the impact on the skill premium of an increase in both
the openness ratio and country size.
A ￿rst potential problem raised by this empirical strategy is that data on wage diﬀerentials
are often of low quality and are not fully comparable across countries. To address this issue,
we appeal to three diﬀerent measures of wage inequality coming from completely diﬀerent
sources. If we can show that our main results are consistent across datasets, we may then
conclude that this is not merely by chance. In particular, we exploit the following widely used
data (see the Data Appendix for more details on the datasets and the construction of the
variables):
33Our result is also in line with a general principle that trade in intermediate inputs can have an important
impact on the structure of production and demand for labour within industries. See Feenstra and Hanson
(1996) and Jones (2000b).
34The main references are Frankel and Romer (1999), Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000) and Alcala￿
a n dC i c c o n e( 2 0 0 4 ) ,w h oa r ec o n c e r n e dw i t ht h ee ﬀects of the extent of the market on per capita income. We
focus instead on skill-biased scale eﬀects.
21a) A panel of economy-wide Mincerian returns to education, drawn from Banerjee and
Du￿o (2005) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004), who provide the latest compilations
of returns to education.35 Our sample comprises 40 countries observed for at least two years
between the early 60s and the late 90s (110 observations overall).
b) A panel of manufacturing skill premia, drawn from the U.N. - General Industrial Sta-
tistics database. Following other studies, we compute the skill premium as the ratio of non-
production to production (operatives) wages in total manufacturing. Our sample comprises
35 countries (70 observations) observed roughly between 1980 and 1990.
c) A panel of Gini coeﬃcients of the net income distribution, drawn from Dollar and Kray
(2002). Our panel comprises 68 countries observed at least twice between the early 60s and
the late 90s (277 observations overall). Although Gini coeﬃcients represent a broader measure
of inequality than Mincerian returns to education or manufacturing skill premia, which are
more closely related to our theory, they may nonetheless shed light on the evolution of wage
inequality overtime, since labour income is an overwhelming share of total income in most
countries.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for selected variables in the three datasets. Note
that the countries in the ￿rst two datasets are similar in terms of average income, openness
and endowments, whereas the average country is smaller and more open in the panel of Gini
coeﬃcients.
A second challenge is the choice of appropriate measures of market size. As mentioned
earlier, for most of the analysis we follow the empirical literature in using measures of country
size (alternatively, labour force or GDP) and trade openness as joint proxies for a country￿s
overall market size.36 Although natural, this identi￿cation strategy may raise some concerns.
In particular, we recognize that trade openness may aﬀect relative wages through mechanisms
other than the scale eﬀect. Domestic market size, instead, is likely to capture a pure scale
eﬀect. Still, it varies little over short time spans. Moreover, one may argue that domestic
variables loose signi￿cance when small countries become integrated with a much larger world
35Mincerian returns to education are obtained as the coeﬃcient of years of schooling in a regression of log
wages on years of schooling. Notwithstanding the eﬀorts of the compilers, estimates of returns to education
are not fully comparable across studies, mainly because of sample coverage and methodology. As for sample
coverage, estimates of returns to education are not always based on a survey of households representative of
the entire population, but rather on a survey of large ￿rms with many employees. As for methodology, a major
limitation is that researchers use diﬀerent sets of controls in their regressions. Moreover, some studies rely on
OLS estimates, while others appeal instead to an IV strategy (it seems, however, that the estimation method
makes little diﬀerence for the results). Finally, some estimates are rated as being of ￿poor quality￿ by Banerjee
and Du￿o (2005). Our dataset does not include any of these low quality estimates. However, some of the
variation in the data we use may be spuriously driven by methodological heterogeneity. We partly address this
problem by relying on Fixed-Eﬀects within regressions, as methodological diﬀerences may be partly absorbed
by country-and time-speci￿ce ﬀects.
36Indeed, the joint importance of these two components is easily understood in our model, where trade
integration between identical countries is isomorphic to an increase in the domestic labor force. More in
general, this is a feature of the models ascribed to the so-called new trade theory.
22economy. We are not too worried about the latter issue because roughly 70% of production
in our sample is destined to domestic markets and factor price equalization clearly does not
hold in reality. Nonetheless, we check the robustness of our results by using a synthetic scale
variable that captures simultaneously the size of the internal and external markets and the
degree of international integration. This will also allow us to get a measure of the overall
scale elasticity of the skill premium.
In particular, we construct a synthetic scale variable, L
tot









size, where the weight is given by a country￿s trade openness
(Opi): L
tot
i =( 1− Opi)Li + OpiLw.37 To compute it, we only need an operational de￿nition
of foreign size
¡
Lf = Lw − Li
¢
. Here, we follow Harrigan (2000) by de￿ning foreign size as
the sum of the economic sizes of all foreign countries multiplied by their openness:38




where j =1 ,...N are countries in the world, Lj is country j￿s total labour force (or GDP)
and Opj is its openness. Lf can be thought of as a proxy for the amount of foreign resources
engaged in international markets.39 Substituting (26) into L
tot
i and rearranging terms gives
our operational de￿nition of country i￿s total market size:
L
tot




This scale variable implies that a country￿s market size rises due to a greater domestic and
foreign exposure to international trade or to a rise in domestic and foreign economic size.40
Data on openness, labour force and GDP come from the Penn World Tables (Marks 5.6
and 6.1). The average correlation across datasets between L
tot
i and labour force equals 0.58,
whereas the average correlation between L
tot
i and the openness ratio equals 0.43.
A ￿nal concern is with the estimation method. Although our model predicts a relationship
between market size and the skill premium both across countries and overtime, throughout the
paper we have emphasized the latter implication. The main reason for this choice of emphasis
is our motivation to explain the observed increase in the skill premia. In the following, we will
37This variable is given a theoretical foundation in Alesina et al (2000).
38As argued by Harrigan (2000), the relevant world market is composed by that part of countries￿ endowments
￿which is engaged in producing goods that are traded internationally￿.
39To compute Lf, we have considered all the countries in the world (about 100) with available data on labour
force (or GDP) and openness over the period of analysis.
40Note that, in order for L
tot
i to make sense, openness must lie in the range [0,1]. Therefore, in computing
L
tot
i ,w ed e ￿ne openness as ((imports + exports)/2)/GDP. For a few outliers (Hong Kong, Singapore and
Luxembourg), openness/2 is greater than one. In these cases, we set it equal to one.
23therefore appeal to Fixed-Eﬀects within regressions, thereby mainly relying on the temporal
variation in the data to estimate the coeﬃcients of interests.41 An advantage of this strategy
is that it allows us to avoid spurious results due to omitted time-invariant determinants of
the wage structure (such as institutional factors that are absent in our model) and thus focus
on a more parsimonious set of controls. In particular, we ￿rst control for the skill endowment
using standard proxies of schooling (average years of schooling and the share of labour force
with some secondary education, from the Barro-Lee dataset). Second, we control for capital
endowment, because it is part of the economic size of a country and because in the presence
of complementarity among inputs (e.g., capital-skill complementarity) its omission may lead
to biased results. The series on capital stock are computed using the perpetual inventory
method, as in Hall and Jones (1999). Third, to control for the eﬀects of technology on
the wage structure, we compute the total factor productivity (TFP) for each country in the
sample. In this, we again follow Hall and Jones (1999). Fourth, we control for real per capita
GDP to capture the eﬀect of omitted or mismeasured variables correlated with per capita
income (e.g., education, technology, etc.). Finally, we control for time dummies to account
for the potential correlation of our covariates with time-speci￿ce ﬀects.
4.1 Scale and Mincerian Returns to Education: Results
We start with a panel of Mincerian returns to education. Figure 4 illustrates some interesting
features of the dataset. It reports the period change in the openness ratio on the horizontal
axis and the period percentage change in the Mincerian returns to education on the vertical
axis. Note that countries such as Mexico, China, Korea, Philippines, Guatemala, Nicaragua
experienced a substantial increase in the returns to education in periods of greater exposure
to international trade. In contrast, for other countries in the dataset, periods of falling trade
exposure are generally associated with falling returns to education.
Table 3 summarizes the main results of our Fixed-Eﬀects within regressions. Time-speci￿c
eﬀects are always included. In column (1), we regress the log of returns to education on the
two scale variables, i.e., the openness ratio and the log of labour force. The coeﬃcients of the
two proxies are positive, as expected, and are signi￿cant at the 1 and 5% levels, respectively.
Next we control for the skill endowment, proxied by years of schooling in column (2) and
by secondary education in column (3). Note that the size and signi￿cance of the coeﬃcients
of the two scale variables are unaﬀected, whereas both proxies for the skill endowment are
insigni￿cant.42 In column (4), we add our main controls, namely, the logs of the capital stock
per worker, TFP and per capita income. Interestingly, the coeﬃcients of the capital stock
41An earlier version of the paper, available upon request, discusses the cross-sectional evidence.
42Banerjee and Du￿o (2005) also ￿nd that returns to education are unrelated to schooling in a cross-sectional
context.
24and TFP are positive and signi￿cant at the 10 and 5% levels, respectively, which is consistent
with both capital-skill complementarity and skill-biased technical change. Note also that
the coeﬃcient of per capita GDP is negative and signi￿cant, while that of schooling is now
positive, probably suggesting that with this data per capita income might be a better proxy
for the skill endowment than standard measures of schooling. More importantly, column (4)
shows that the coeﬃcients of the two scale variables are large, positive and signi￿cant at the
1% level. The point estimate suggest that a one percentage point increase in the openness
ratio is associated with a 2% increase in the return to education, while the elasticity of the
returns to education to country size is roughly equal to 1.5. In column (5), we proxy country
size with the log of GDP instead of labour force. The simple correlation between GDP and
labour force is not too high (0.48), yet the results are virtually identical. Figure 4 suggests
that two observations, Pakistan and Mexico (1990-95), may have a disproportionate impact
on the coeﬃcient of the openness ratio. In column (6), we therefore re-run regression (4) after
dropping these two observations. Note that the signi￿cance of our coeﬃcients of interest is
unaﬀected.
Finally, in columns (7) and (8) we proxy for scale with the log of our synthetic scale
variable L
tot
i , instead of controlling for country size and openness separately. In particular, in
c o l u m n( 7 )w eu s el a b o u rf o r c et oc o m p u t eL
tot
i , whereas in column (8) we use instead GDP.43
The coeﬃcient of this synthetic scale variable has the expected sign and is signi￿cant at the 5
or 1% level. It is also large in magnitude, suggesting that the overall scale elasticity of returns
to education is roughly between 0.5 and 1.
4.2 Scale and Skill Premia: Results
We now test for skill-biased scale eﬀects using a panel of manufacturing skill premia observed
during the 1980s. Figure 5 reports the change in the openness ratio on the horizontal axis and
the percentage change in the skill premium on the vertical axis. It shows that countries such
as Turkey, Mexico, Chile, Malaysia, that increased substantially their outward orientation
during the 1980s, also experienced a concomitant increase in the skill premium. In contrast,
countries such as Japan, Korea, Finland, Egypt, whose trade exposure fell, experienced a fall
in the skill premium as well. This is suggestive of a positive association between openness
and skill premia, which is con￿rmed by the formal econometric analysis summarized in Table
4. Here we follow the same steps as before by running Fixed-Eﬀects within regressions of the
log of manufacturing skill premia on various measures of market size, skill endowment and
other controls. In column (1), the log of the skill premium is regressed on the openness ratio
and the log of labour force only. The coeﬃcient of openness is positive, large and signi￿cant
43The simple correlation between the two variables is 0.53.
25beyond the 1% level. It suggests that a one percentage point increase in the openness ratio
brings about a 0.5% increase in the skill premium. The coeﬃcient of country size is also large
and positive, suggesting that the elasticity of the skill premium to the country size is roughly
equal to 0.3. However, it is signi￿cant at the 10% level only, which is not surprising, since
there is little variation in the growth of country size over a time span of a decade only and
hence its eﬀect can hardly be estimated with great precision. In columns (2) and (3), we add
years of schooling and secondary education and ￿nd, again, that schooling is unrelated to
the skill premium. Note, also, that the coeﬃcients of our two scale variables are unchanged
across speci￿cations, although in column (2) the coeﬃcient of country size is signi￿cant at the
12% level only. In column (4), we add the logs of the capital stock per worker, TFP and per
capita income. These controls turn out insigni￿cant, whereas the coeﬃcients of openness and
country size are unaﬀected and still signi￿cant at the 1 and 10% levels, respectively. Similar
results are obtained using the log of GDP instead of labour force as a proxy for country size.
As shown in Figure 5, there are three countries (Malaysia, Luxembourg and the Fiji
islands) that may have a disproportionate impact on the estimated coeﬃcient of the openness
ratio. In column (6), we therefore re-run the regression in column (4) after dropping these
observations. In this case, the coeﬃcient of the openness ratio becomes larger, although
slightly less precisely estimated (but still signi￿cant at the 5% level). The coeﬃcient of
country size is also slightly larger and signi￿cant at the 10% level.
Finally, in columns (7) and (8) we replace country size and the openness ratio with the log
of our synthetic scale variable L
tot
i (using, respectively, labour force and GDP to compute it).
We ￿nd that the coeﬃcient of the scale variable is stable and signi￿cant beyond the 1% level
in the two speci￿cations, implying an overall scale elasticity of the skill premium around 30%.
Note also that the overall scale elasticity of the skill premium estimated in columns (7)-(8)
is almost identical to the elasticity of the skill premium to country size estimated in columns
(1)-(6). This suggests that, consistent with our model, either the growth of country size or a
greater trade openness may have a similar impact on the skill premium as long as they bring
about a similar expansion in market size.
4.3 Scale and Income Inequality: Results
As a ￿nal step, we confront our mechanism with a panel of Gini coeﬃcients of the net income
distribution. Figure 6 reports the period change in the openness ratio on the horizontal axis
and the period percentage change in the Gini coeﬃcients on the vertical axis. It suggests,
again, a positive association between openness and inequality. Table 5 summarizes the main
results of the Fixed-Eﬀects within regressions. Time-speci￿ce ﬀects are always controlled
f o r . W ef o l l o wt h es a m es t e p sa si nt h ep r e v i o u st w os e c t i o n s . I np a r t i c u l a r ,i nc o l u m n
( 1 )w er e g r e s st h el o go ft h eG i n ic o e ﬃcient on the openness ratio and the log of labour
26force; in columns (2) and (3), we add proxies for the skill endowment (years of schooling
and secondary education, respectively); in column (4), we add the main controls, namely, the
logs of the capital stock per worker, TFP and per capita income; in column (5), we add the
square of the log of income to control for a Kuznets-type relationship between income and
inequality; in column (6), we use the log of GDP instead of labour force as a proxy for country
size. Table 5 shows that the coeﬃcient of country size is fairly stable across speci￿cations
and always signi￿cant beyond the 1% level. It suggests that the elasticity of inequality to
country size is roughly equal to 25%. The coeﬃcient of the openness ratio is also stable across
speci￿cations and always signi￿cant at the 5% level, suggesting that a one percentage point
increase in the openness ratio brings about a 0.1% increase in income inequality. Finally, in
columns (7) and (8) we proxy for scale with our synthetic variable L
tot
i (using labour force and
GDP, respectively, to compute it). In both speci￿cations, the coeﬃcient of the scale variable
is positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level, implying an overall scale elasticity of inequality of
about 10%. As for the other variables, the coeﬃcient of the proxies for the skill endowment is
now always negative, as expected, and signi￿cant in most speci￿cations. The coeﬃcient of the
capital-labour ratio is positive, large and also highly signi￿cant in some speci￿cations. There
is also evidence of a negative correlation between per capita income and inequality, but not
of a Kuznets curve. Finally, the coeﬃcient of TFP is large and signi￿cant at the 12% level in
one speci￿cation.
To conclude, the evidence suggests that scale is skill-biased and that the scale elasticity of
wage inequality may be large. In fact, it is generally larger than the elasticity computed from
the theoretical model in the previous section, con￿rming that our calibration was conservative.
Yet, we recognize that our paper does not necessarily provide the only potentially relevant
explanation for these ￿ndings. In particular, Thoenig and Verdier (2003), Dinopoulos et al
(2001) and Neary (2002) provide mechanisms where market size is also linked to skill premia
through skill-biased technical change, which is consistent with our own evidence. To address
this issue, we have controlled for TFP and found that it does not aﬀect (indeed, it often
increases) the size and signi￿cance of the coeﬃcients of our scale variables. However, TFP is
far from being a perfect proxy for skill biased technical change and our scale variables may
still capture some technological elements if a larger market promotes skill-biased innovations.
Therefore, we do not read our results as evidence against some of the most credited alternative
theories for the increase in skill premia. Indeed, we believe that disentangling the relative
merits of these competing theories using micro-level evidence represents an exciting avenue
for future research.
274.4 Evidence from Other Studies
Other empirical studies lend indirect support to our results. Antweiler and Tre￿er (2002),
using trade data for 71 countries and 5 years, show that a rise in output tends to increase the
relative demand for skilled workers. Our theoretical model provides an explanation for their
￿nding. Historical evidence seems consistent with a skill-biased scale eﬀect too: Lindert and
Williamson (2001), for example, show that inequality widened during globalisation booms
and after massive immigration, whereas it decreased in the period 1914-1950 of protectionism
and in the presence of massive emigration. Likewise, Goldin and Katz (1999) show that
periods of narrowing of the wage structure in the US during the ￿r s th a l fo ft h eT w e n t i e t h
century coincided with major economic disruptions. After the wage compression that followed
immediately the Second World War (1939-1949), returns to skill remained fairly stable (or
even increasing) in the US and fell again during the turbulent years of the Seventies. Since
then, skill premia have been on the upward trend. Note that such a behaviour of relative wages
would be hard to explain, given the steady increase in the supply of skilled workers throughout
the century, unless some other mechanism, like the one we suggest, had continuously raised
the demand for skill. Finally, Hine and Wright (1998) report indirect evidence in support
of the mechanism illustrated in the paper. With reference to the United Kingdom, they
estimate the magnitude of trade-induced productivity eﬀects. Their most interesting result is
that trade with other OECD countries has a much stronger eﬀect on productivity than trade
with developing countries. This is consistent with our model, in primis, because the economic
size of the OECD countries (and therefore the trade-generated scale eﬀect) is larger than that
of developing countries; in secundis, because the UK trade with advanced countries is mainly
intra-industry trade in skill-intensive goods characterized by strong scale economies (thereby
the more pronounced productivity gain).
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The most original result of our analysis is to show that the scale of an economy can be a key
determinant of the skill premium. This is a general result that applies to diﬀerent contexts.
In this paper, we have emphasized the role played by a trade-induced scale eﬀect, instead
of country-speci￿cs c a l ee ﬀects, such as factor accumulation or technical progress. A ￿rst
reason for this focus is policy relevance. Trade is the only scale variable that can change
abruptly as a consequence of policy reform. Second, if globalisation goes far enough, factor
prices will mainly be determined at the world level and country-speci￿c variables will lose
their importance. Third, trade is fundamental in our story because the scale eﬀect operates
through the increase in the number of available intermediates made possible by some form of
trade. Finally, our framework shows that a ￿new trade theory￿ explanation based on intra-
28industry trade may reconcile the increase in skill premia with the empirical evidence often
used to discredit more traditional trade explanations. We consider this as an important result
per se.
We have derived our results for a speci￿c market structure (monopolistic competition)
and speci￿c functional forms on the basis of our reading of the empirical evidence, to have a
sense of the quantitative signi￿cance of the eﬀect we discuss. Much of the debate on trade
and wages is, in fact, centred on the magnitude of the trade-induced eﬀects. But our model
is an example of a more general principle, surprisingly neglected in the debate: as long as the
activities performed by skilled workers enjoy stronger returns to scale than those performed
by the unskilled, and the elasticity of substitution among them is non-unitary, any increase
in market size is non-neutral to income distribution.
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6 Appendix
6.1 The General Model
We study now the more general case in which each good is a Cobb-Douglas composite of H,
L and K. We assume that the total cost function of a single variety produced in sector i is:





where r is the rental rate, γ is the share of capital in total cost, and αi (i = h,l)i st h e
wage-bill share of skilled workers in sector i. We assume that αh >α l,n a m e l yt h a ts e c t o rh
is skill-intensive relative to sector l. The relative price of skill-intensive varieties implied by













l )1−γ = ω(1−γ)(αh−αl). (29)
Free-entry and the simplifying assumption Fi =1 /σi ￿x the scale of production of each variety








The demand for each factor can be found using Shephard￿s lemma on the total cost function
(28). After setting wl as the numeraire, the conditions for full employment of capital, skilled







33and unskilled workers become:
K = γrγ−1ω(1−γ)αhnh + γrγ−1ω(1−γ)αlnl
H =( 1 − γ)αhrγω(1−γ)αh−1nh +( 1− γ)αlrγω(1−γ)αl−1nl
L =( 1 − γ)(1− αh)rγω(1−γ)αhnh +( 1− γ)(1− αl)rγω(1−γ)αlnl.
Solving for nh and nl gives:
ni =
(1 − αj)Hω− αjL
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These partial derivatives come from the production side of the economy. They imply that
the higher the supply of one factor, the larger the size of the sector which uses that factor
intensively, and that the larger the size of one sector, the higher the relative reward for the
factor which is used intensively in that sector. Using the expressions for nh and nl in (30)







































Given the inequalities in (31) and our assumption 1 < <σ h <σ l, it can be seen that the skill
premium is increasing in the scale and decreasing in the share of skilled workers. Equations
(14) and (20) are all special cases of this formula.
Finally, it is possible to show that, with non-extreme factor intensities, the aggregate
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers (holding the other variables
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Rearranging, we can write the elasticity of substitution in consumption ( )a saf u n c t i o no f




















Note that εw > 1 implies  >1 (also, εw =   if αh =1and αl =0 ). Further, equation (33)
shows that, for a given value of the elasticity of substitution between workers of diﬀerent types
(εw), the elasticity of substitution between goods ( ) is higher the lower the factor intensity
diﬀerences across sectors. To give a concrete example, εw =1 .5 (as in most labour market
sudies), σh =6 , σh →∞together with αh =0 .75 and αl =0 .25 imply an   of 3 and an
increase in the skill-premium of 14% after a doubling of all factors. This suggests that even
in this model the scale eﬀect can be quantitatively large.
6.2 The Data
Data on Mincerian returns to education are drawn from Banerjee and Du￿o (2005) and
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004). Our sample comprises the following 40 countries: (in
parenthesis we specify the years in which Mincerian returns are collected for each country;
an asterisk denotes the countries for which we do not have data for some of our independent
variables): Australia (1980, 1985, 1989), Austria (1981, 1985, av(1989-91)), Bolivia (1981,
1990), Brazil (1970, 1980, 1989, 1995), Canada (1981, 1986, 1989), Chile (1974, 1980, 1989),
China (1988, 1993), Colombia (1965, 1974), Costa Rica (1980, 1985, av(1988-91)), Cyprus
(1984, 1994), Denmark (1980, 1990), El Salvador (1985, 1990), Finland (1980, 1987, av(1989-
91), 1993), Ghana (1989, 1995), Greece (1964, 1977, 1985, av(1987-93)), Guatemala (1977,
1986, 1989), Honduras (1986, 1990), Indonesia (1981, 1995), Italy (1977, 1983, 1985, 1987),
Japan (1975, 1988), Kenya (1970, 1986), Korea (1974, 1979, 1986), Mexico (1984, av(1989-91),
1995), Netherlands (1962, 1965, 1972, av(1979-82), 1985, 1989,1994), Nicaragua (1985, 1996),
Norway (1980, av(1983-87), av(1989-91), 1995), Pakistan (1986, 1991), Panama (1983, 1990),
Paraguay (1983, 1990), Peru (1985, 1991), Philippines (1982, 1988, av(1994-98)), Poland*
(1992, 1996), Portugal (1977, 1985, 1991), Spain (1985, 1990), Sweden (1968, 1974, 1981,
1984, 1990), Switzerland (1987, 1990), Thailand (1971, 1986, 1989), United Kingdom (1975,
1984), USA (1976, 1987, 1995), Venezuela (1975, 1984).
Data on manufacturing skill premia come from the UN - General Industrial Statistics
database. Our sample comprises the following 35 countries (in parenthesis, we specify the
years in which skill premia are collected for each country): Australia (1980, 1987), Austria
(1980, 1990), Bangladesh (1979, 1989), Canada (1980, 1990), Chile (1978, 1990), Colombia
(1980, 1990), Cyprus (1980, 1990), Denmark (1980, 1990), Egypt (1980, 1988), Ethiopia (1980,
1988), Fiji (1979, 1990), Finland (1980, 1990), Greece (1977, 1990), Guatemala (1978, 1988),
35India (1978, 1988), Ireland (1978, 1989), Italy (1980, 1989), Japan (1981, 1990), Korea (1979,
1990), Luxembourg (1980, 1990), Malaysia (1983, 1990), Mexico (1986, 1990), Pakistan (1981,
1988), Panama (1979, 1989), Peru (1980, 1988), Philippines (1977, 1987), Spain (1980, 1990),
Sweden (1980, 1990), Tanzania (1981, 1985), Turkey (1980, 1990), USA (1980, 1990), United
Kingdom (1980, 1990), Uruguay (1980, 1988), Venezuela (1979, 1990), West Germany (1980,
1990).
Data on Gini coeﬃcients of the net income distribution come from Dollar and Kray (2002).
Our sample comprises the following 68 countries (in parenthesis, we specify the years in which
Gini coeﬃcients are collected for each country; an asterisk denotes countries for which we do
not have data for some of our independent variables): Australia (1976, 1981, 1986, 1993),
Belgium (1979, 1985, 1992), Bangladesh (1963, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1995), Bolivia (1968,
1990), Brazil (1960, 1970, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1993), Canada (1965, 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987,
1994), Chile (1968, 1980, 1987, 1992), Cote d￿Ivoire* (1985, 1993), Colombia (1964, 1970,
1978, 1988, 1995), Costa Rica (1961, 1969, 1977, 1982, 1989, 1996), Denmark (1963, 1976,
1981, 1986, 1991), Dominican Republic (1976, 1984, 1989, 1996), Ecuador (1968, 1988, 1994),
Egypt (1965, 1975, 1991), Spain (1965, 1973, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1996), Ethiopia* (1981, 1995),
Finland (1962, 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1995), Fiji (1968, 1977), France (1962, 1970, 1975, 1981,
1989), Gabon* (1960, 1975), United Kingdom (1961, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986), Germany
(1989, 1994), Ghana (1992, 1997), Greece (1974, 1981, 1988), Guatemala (1979, 1987), Hong
Kong (1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991), Honduras (1968, 1986, 1991, 1996), Indonesia (1964,
1970, 1976, 1981, 1987, 1993, 1999), India (1964, 1969, 1977, 1983, 1988, 1993), Ireland
(1973, 1980, 1987), Iran (1969, 1984), Italy (1974, 1979, 1984, 1989), Jamaica (1971, 1988,
1993), Jordan (1980, 1986, 1991, 1997), Japan (1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1989, 1994),
Korea (1961, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1982, 1988, 1993), Sri Lanka (1963, 1970, 1979, 1985, 1990,
1995), Lesotho (1986, 1993), Luxembourg* (1985, 1991), Madagascar* (1960, 1980, 1993),
Mexico (1963, 1968, 1975, 1984, 1989, 1995), Mali (1989, 1994), Mauritania* (1988, 1993),
Mauritius (1980, 1986, 1991), Malaysia (1970, 1976, 1984, 1989, 1995), Niger(1960, 1992),
Nigeria* (1985, 1991, 1997), Netherlands (1962, 1975, 1981, 1986, 1991), Norway (1962, 1967,
1973, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1995), New Zealand (1973, 1978, 1983, 1989), Pakistan (1964, 1969,
1979, 1985, 1990, 1996), Panama (1969, 1979, 1989, 1995), Peru (1961, 1971, 1981, 1986,
1994), Philippines (1965, 1971, 1985, 1991, 1997), Portugal (1973, 1980, 1989, 1994), Senegal
(1960, 1991), Singapore (1978, 1983, 1988, 1993), Sierra Leone (1968, 1989), El Salvador
(1965, 1989, 1995), Sweden (1963, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995), Seychelles* (1978, 1984),
Thailand (1962, 1969, 1975, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998), Trinidad &Tobago (1971, 1976, 1981,
1988), Tunisia (1965, 1971, 1980, 1985, 1990), Turkey (1973, 1987, 1994), Tanzania (1964,
1969, 1977, 1991), Venezuela (1962, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1987, 1993), Zambia (1959, 1976, 1991,
1996).
36Finally, to compute the total factor productivity (TFP), we follow Hall and Jones (1999).
First, we estimate the capital stock using the perpetual inventory method (we assume a
depreciation rate of 6%), and then compute, for each country i and year t,t h el o go fT F P
as: lnTFPit =l n ( yit) − α
1−α ln(Kit
Yit ) − ln(hit),w h e r ey is GDP per worker, K/Y is the
capital/output ratio, α =1 /3,a n dh is human capital per worker (hit = eφ(Eit),w h e r eE
stands for years of education and φ is a piecewise linear function speci￿ed as in Hall and
Jones).
37 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Datasets on Inequality 
(Selected variables) 




Skill Premia  
(1990) 
Gini Coefficients  
of Inequality  
(1990) 
 
Index of inequality  9.70     
(5.28) 
2.10     
(.87) 
43.17     
(10.63) 
 
Per capita income  10484     
(8030) 
11295     
(8346) 
7733     
(7319) 
 
Openness ratio  0.54     
(0.19) 
0.58     
(0.42) 
0.75     
(0.60) 
 
Labour force  
(thousands) 
34894     
(115122) 
26479     
(58337) 
15140     
(42153) 
 
Average years of 
schooling 
6.68     
(2.62) 
6.74     
(2.76) 
5.26     
(2.76) 
 
Capital stock per 
worker 
56404     
(47146) 
55740     
(43899) 
38727     
(43504) 
 
No. of countries  39-40  35  60-68  
The table displays the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of selected variables 












































































































































Period Change in the Openness Ratio
slope coeff. = 1.23 (t = 2.90)
 
Figure 4 – Openness and Returns to Education 
Table 3. Scale and Returns to Education 
Dependent variable: log of Mincerian returns to education 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















Openness      1.78*** 
(0.443) 
    1.84*** 
(0.440) 
    1.78*** 
(0.445) 
    2 .16*** 
(0.449) 
    2.15*** 
(0.449) 
    1.64*** 
(0.381) 
  
               0.565** 
(0.278) 




   0.983** 
(0.471) 
   0.961** 
(0.466) 
   1.02** 
(0.476) 
    1.65*** 
(0.528) 
    1.47*** 
(0.472) 
    1.32*** 
(0.436) 
  
          




    0.277*** 
(0.099) 
  0.198** 
 (0.094) 






          
Log capital 
stock 










          










          
Log Income          -2.08** 
(1.04) 








          
No. obs.   110   110   110   108   108   106   108   108 
Groups   40   40   40   39   39   38   39   39 
R-squared 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.20 0.33 
Fixed-Effects within estimates with standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.  All 
equations include time dummies, whose coefficients are not reported in the table. Country size is proxied by labour force in columns (1)-
(4) and (6), by GDP in column (5), and by the scale variable defined by equation (27) in columns (7)-(8). Openness is measured at current 
prices. Schooling is proxied by secondary education in column (3) and by the average years of schooling otherwise.  In column (6), two 
outlier observations (Pakistan and Mexico) are excluded from the sample. Data sources: Banerjee and Duflo (2005), Psacharopoulos and 
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Change in the Openness Ratio: 1980-90
slope coeff. = 0.58 (t = 3.96)
 
        Figure 5 – Openness and Skill Premia 
 
Table 4. Scale and Skill Premia 
Dependent variable: log of manufacturing skill premia 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















Openness      0.568*** 
(0.186) 
    0.569*** 
(0.189) 
    0.568*** 
(0.189) 
    0.543*** 
(0.193) 
    0.541*** 
(0.193) 
   0.608** 
(0.286) 
  
                 0.322*** 
(0.091) 

















           














           
Log capital 
stock 










           










           










           
No. obs.   70   70   70   70   70   64   70   70 
Groups   35   35   35    35   35   32   35   35 
R-squared  0.34  0.34 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.37 0.32 
Fixed-Effects within estimates with standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Country 
size is proxied by labour force in columns (1)-(4) and (6), by GDP in column (5), and by the scale variable defined by equation (27) in 
columns (7)-(8). Openness is measured at current prices. Schooling is proxied by the average years of schooling in columns (1) and (2) 
and by secondary education otherwise. In column (6), three outliers are excluded from the sample (Malaysia, Fiji and Luxembourg). 
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Period Change in the Openness Ratio
slope coeff. = 0.13 (t = 2.40)
 
           Figure 6 – Openness and Income Inequality 
 
 
Table 5. Scale and Income Inequality  
Dependent variable: log of Gini coefficients of the net income distribution 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
































                  0.097*** 
(0.038) 




   0.233*** 
(0.061) 
    0.230***   
(0.063) 
   0.166*** 
(0.063) 
    0.293*** 
(0.073) 
    0.296*** 
(0.093) 
    0.251*** 
(0.068) 
  
           
Schooling      -0.039***   
(0.013) 












           
Log capital 
stock 










           










           










           
Log income 
squared 
       0.001 
(0.017) 
   
           
No. obs.   277   257   257   257   257   257   257   257 
Groups   68   60   60   60   60   60   60   60 
R-squared  0.14  0.17 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.16 
Fixed-effects within estimates with standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. All 
equations include time dummies, whose coefficients are not reported in the table. Country size is proxied by labour force in columns (1)-
(5), by GDP in column (6) and by the scale variable defined by equation (27) in columns (7)-(8). Openness is measured at current 
prices. Schooling is proxied by secondary education in column (3) and by the average years of schooling otherwise. Data sources: 
Dollar and Kray (2002), PWT and Barro-Lee. 